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Abstract. Social engineering attacks are one of the most well-known and easiest 
to apply attacks in the cybersecurity domain. Research has shown that the major-
ity of attacks against computer systems was based on the use of social engineer-
ing methods. Considering the importance of emerging fields such as machine 
learning and cybersecurity we have developed a method that detects social engi-
neering attacks that is based on natural language processing and artificial neural 
networks. This method can be applied in offline texts or online environments and 
flag a conversation as a social engineering attack or not. Initially, the conversa-
tion text is parsed and checked for grammatical errors using natural language 
processing techniques and then an artificial neural network is used to classify 
possible attacks. The proposed method has been evaluated using a real dataset 
and a semi-synthetic dataset with very high accuracy results. Furthermore, alter-
native classification methods have been used for comparisons in both datasets.   
Keywords: Social Engineering, Attack Detection, Online Chat Environments, 
Natural Language Processing, Neural Networks, Cybersecurity. 
1 Introduction 
There have been various research projects demonstrating the need for an automated 
system to recognize SE attacks. Many of these projects show proof of concept models 
using a variety of different techniques, most commonly Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) methods like Artificial Neural Networks. Whilst 
these exist, there is a lack of evidence that the theory has been implemented and proved 
working, with very little evidence of the rate of success [1-4].  
Human Psychology plays a large part in the creation of NLP software as it is 
important to understand how people socialize and behave with others. A common and 
well-regarded psychologist, Dr. Robert Cialdini proposed the 6 principles of persuasion 
[5]: Authority, Scarcity, Liking/Similarity, Reciprocation, Social Proof and Commit-
ment/Consistency. Further studies by psychologists also follow a similar consensus that 
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these are the key factors in defining a persuasive person. Using these key features as a 
base, Computer Scientists theorized and attempted to build systems that recognized 
these traits. The research projects on this area can be loosely broken down into three 
stages, Data Pre-Processing, Feature Extraction and Aggregation of Results as shown 
in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Most research approaches into this problem domain have some relevant data and these 
data are usually pre-processed. The method of pre-processing differs per system, but 
generally involves the same goal; preparing the data for classification. The contextual, 
or meta data, such as time, date and IP addresses are captured in a relationship with the 
original data. This can be used for correlating different dialogues with one another, one 
by matching the IP as an internal or external agent and secondly by highlighting poten-
tial reoccurring adversaries that may persist under different aliases. The dialogues are 
sanitized to remove any erroneous content such as HTML tags or corrupt texts. The 
data can then be parsed using a Natural Language Processing (NLP) parser such as the 
Stanford CoreNLP [6]. NLP parsers provide a vast array of tools that are able to dissect 
the human language into dependency trees, define grammatical relations and their Parts 
of Speech (POS) to name a few common uses. Using these libraries, it allows program-
mers to create algorithms which are able to classify conversations based on the linguis-
tic features the parser extracts. 
This paper is based on the concept that a dialogue is taking place in an online 
chat environment. To determine if a dialog between two interlocutors is a Social Engi-
neering attack, certain criteria, or else known as features, need to be chosen, a process 
known as feature selection. The features are selected before the three stages and are 
commonly based on the principles of persuasion, common phishing tactics like mali-
cious links and the history of the attacker. We can then classify the data based on these 
features and produce a ‘score’ of how strongly the selected dialog matches the criteria. 
Each implementation designed to detect each feature will use a variety of classification 
techniques, such as: Fuzzy Logic, Topic Blacklists, Decision Trees, Random Forest and 
Neural Networks depending on what needs to be extracted. Furthermore, an automated 
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system requires the output of a clear decision, albeit a probabilistic decision, this can 
be done by aggregating the outputs from the Feature Extraction process. The results of 
each feature are weighted by importance, and at basic level can be averaged to give a 
Fuzzy logic prediction. By using more advanced techniques such as decision trees or 
neural networks, the weight of each feature can be calculated programmatically to de-
termine which features carry the most importance regarding whether or not a social 
engineering attack is taking place. 
 
The following contributions are delivered: 
 
1. A method for detecting social engineering attack in online chat environ-
ments is proposed. 
2. The proposed method has been evaluated using a real and a semi-synthetic 
dataset with the results validating our approach. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the related work, section 
3 delivers the proposed method, section 4 contains the experimental evaluation and 
section 5 is the conclusions part. 
2 Related work 
An early implementation of SE detection in real-time telephone systems is SEDA (So-
cial Engineering Defense Architecture) [7]. The researchers mainly focused on identi-
fying repeat callers using their voice signatures. Later a proof of concept model of 
SEDA [8] was produced being able to correctly identify all attacks in their dataset. A 
method of detection used by [1] is to identify the questions requesting private infor-
mation and commands requesting that the user perform tasks they are not authorized to 
perform. This technique uses a manually derived topic blacklist of verb-noun pairs for 
which they state should be built around security policies associated with a system. This 
work is taken further in [2] by identifying 4 main attack; the urgency of the dialog, 
negative commands and questions, whether the message is likely automated identified 
by a generic greeting. Finally, they use a reputable cyber security service, Netcraft, to 
check the safety of a URL. Instead of manual blacklist creation, they use a large corpus 
of phishing emails to generate a topic blacklist using a Naive Bayes classier. Some 
approaches like SEADMv2 [3] and MPMPA [9] use complex state machines in order 
to map out the pathways that can be followed as a checklist-type system to mitigate an 
attack. This proposal is suited where there are multiple authorization layers that might 
prevent a request from being carried out. These two separate machines provide some 
overlap, but the explicit state definition required could be limiting to where these can 
be applied. The nature of SE attacks is unpredictable meaning that new methods of 
attacks are always being introduced. The SEADM versions state machines still rely on 
the user input for changing state, which means the chance for user error and naivety is 
still present. The works of [4] covers an extensive overview of the existing systems and 
provide a comprehensive recognition of subsystems for their detection architecture; in 
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influence, deception, personality, speech act and past experiences. The work of [10] 
provides a semantic based approach of dialogues to detect social engineering attacks. 
In [11] the authors show that the human factor is the weakest link in social engineering 
attacks and based on a human study the prove that. In [12] and [13] the authors provide 
a theoretical foundation that potentially could be used in real systems to detect attacks., 
In the works of [14] it is explained how social engineering attacks can potentially be 
detected, whereas in [15] and [16] different examples of attacks with scenarios are pre-
sented. In addition to the works mentioned, there are numerous other articles from rel-
evant domains that can be useful such as the one in [17] where the authors performed 
an influence analysis of the number of members on the quality of knowledge in a col-
lective, the work in [18] where a neural network is used along with harmony for search-
ing, the one in [19] where nature inspired optimization algorithms for fuzzy control 
servo systems are discussed and the one found in [20] where an Island-based cuckoo 
search algorithm with highly disruptive polynomial mutation is proposed. 
3 Proposed method 
The proposed method consists of several steps to preprocess the dialogs into a dataset 
for classification. The last steps are applying the classifier.  All the steps explained 
below, have been written in the Python programming language. The SymSpellpy li-
brary (a Python port of SymSpell) was used for spelling, the Web of Trust (WOT) Ap-
plication Programming Interface (API) was used to check any links and finally the 
SciKit library for the MLP classifier. 
In more particular, steps 1 to 5 check for malicious links, steps 6 and 7 deter-
mine the spelling quality, and steps 8 to 11 determine the intent of the text, using a pre-
defined blacklist. The score of each feature can be given by: Link score, 𝑆", Spelling 
score, 𝑆#$, and Intent score, 𝑆%. Each score is then scaled down to between 0 and 1. 
After the pre-processing of the dialogues (steps 1 – 11), the classification dataset has 
the following 4 labels: (1) Intent, (2) Spelling, (3) Link and (4) attack or no attack. The 
final steps use these as inputs for the MLP classifier.  
 
The steps are as follows: 
 
1. Extract all URLs from the dialog text using a regex pattern matcher.  
2. If the text contains URLs, send the link/s to the WOT API to evaluate if the 
web link is malicious. 
3. The WOT API returns the reputation of the site (value between 0-100), the 
confidence of the given reputation (value between 0-100) and the identifying 
categories (17 in total) that identify the nature of the website. The broad cate-
gories and example subcategories are as follows:  
• 1XX Negative (101 Malware, 103 Phishing, 104 Scam, 105 Poten-
tially illegal etc.)  
• 2XX Questionable (201 Misleading claims or unethical, 205 spam, 
207 ads / popups etc.) 
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• 3XX Neutral (301 Online tracking, 302 controversial, 303 political 
etc.) 
• 5XX Positive (501 A good site) 
4. If the returned category is of group 1XX or 2XX, then 𝑆" = 1. 
5. Otherwise, divide the reputation by 100 and take it away from 1 as shown in 
equation 1. 
 𝑆" = 1 −	𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒100  (1) 
  
 
 
6. Check for spelling using the SymSpellpy library. 
7. Using the best suggested spelling correction, determine the number of mis-
spelled words, given by 𝑥. This number is then scaled between 0 and 1 by 
applying Equation 2. The value of 𝑆78 represents the spelling quality, where 
higher values represents poorer spelling. Rather than a linear function, an ex-
ponential function is used to rate a higher number of spelling mistakes more 
severely. To adjust the rate at which the score tends towards 1, the constant 𝑎 
can be varied to affect how harsh you want to be on spelling errors. After 
extensive testing it was identified that 0.5 allowed the text to contain a small 
number of mistakes without creating a high score. For example, if 𝑎 is set to 
0.5 and 𝑥	 = 	1 then 𝑆78 = 0.39, if 𝑥	 = 	5 then 𝑆78 =	0.92.  
 
 𝑆78 = 	1 − 𝑒:;< (2) 
 
 
8. The next step uses the corrected spelling of the dialog, and checks it against a 
blacklist, derived from 48 security policy style words. This can be easily pop-
ulated with company or environment related words such as: credentials, pass-
words, database etc. The number of blacklist matched words is given by 𝑀>. 
9. The algorithm at this step checks for intent verbs and adjectives such as need, 
must, urgent etc. This value is given by 𝑀% 
10. To tune the results, values 𝑀>	and 𝑀% are multiplied by the weights 𝑊> and 𝑊%, weighted at values of 2 and 1 retrospectively. This step has been added as 
an equation in case someone wants to change the weight of this step, if it is 
considered more important. The value 𝑥 can hence be given by equation 3. 
 
 𝑥 = (𝑀> ×𝑊>) + (𝑀% ×𝑊%)	 (3) 
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11. Then, the value of 𝑥 is normalized in equation 4, using the same exponential 
function as equation 2. Where 𝑎 = 0.4 to give the best output. A higher value 
of 𝑆% indicates a higher concentration of blacklisted words in the text.  
 
 𝑆% = 	1 − 𝑒:;<	 (4) 
 
 
12. At this step the original dialogue dataset is being checked to identify which 
dialogue was indeed an attack and assign the true (1) or false (0) value to the 
new dataset used for classification. 
 
13. The dataset is populated and the MLP classifier is applied. If the output is high, 
then it is considered an attack otherwise it is not considered an attack. Initially, 
we define an activation function as: 𝑔(𝑧)	with 𝑥 input values and 𝑤 weights 
as input. The activation function is shown in equation 7. 
 z	 = 	wKxK + wMxM +⋯	+	wOxO (7) 
 
If g(z) is greater than a given threshold theta, the output is 1 or -1 otherwise, a
 s shown in equation 8. 
 
g (z) = P 1	if	z>theta-1	otherwise (8) 
 
 
Where z	 = 	wKxK + wMxM +⋯	+	wOxO =		∑ x]w]O]^K 	= 	w_x 
 
At the next step, we use Rosenblatt’s perceptron rule to update the weights as 
follows: (a) Each weight was initialized with small random numbers and (b) 
for each iterative training step for each input x the output value was calculated, 
and the weights were updated. 
 
The output update is defined in equation 9, with ∆𝑤a =	𝑒	b𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡(𝑖)– 	𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑖)d	𝑥ae		and 𝑒 is the learning rate, target the actual 
(true) class label and output the predicted label. Weight updates were iterative, 
and updates were performed simultaneously. 
 
 	𝑤af = 	𝑤a 		+ 	D𝑤a		 (9) 
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4 Experimental evaluation 
The experimental evaluation took place in an offline environment using a real dataset 
and a semi-synthetic dataset, which we call the standard dataset and the compound da-
taset. Following from section 3, we have built both datasets using a social engineering 
attack dataset with 147 entries classified as an attack or not. After the preprocessing 
steps followed in section three, we derived the following four classification labels: (a) 
intent (b) spelling (c) link (d) is attack1. Furthermore, the standard dataset contains 147 
entries obtained from [12], while the compound dataset is based on the 147 entries plus 
600 entries from customer support-based tweets from Twitter, none of which are clas-
sified as attacks. Both dataset text entries have been converted to numerical based clas-
sification datasets with four entries each. Three labels for the respective data and one 
with a yes or no (1 or 0) value of a conversation being a social engineering attack or 
not. To both datasets a small number of links to websites have been added, with some 
being malicious. 
 The accuracy metric has been used for the evaluating the classification models. 
The metric calculates the fraction of the prediction that each model got right. Equation 
10 represents the accuracy where TP stands for true positives, TN for true negatives, 
FP for false positives and FN for false negatives. 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 (10) 
  
The results of the evaluation as shown in tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are based 
on the standard and compound datasets respectively and a 5-fold cross-validation ap-
proach has been used. In tables 1 to 6 the MAX and MIN values represent the maximum 
and minimum values of the 5-fold returned after each time the algorithm ran and the 
MEAN is the median value. Each algorithm was executed 10 times and at the end of 
each table the value is the mean value of 10 iterations for each of the three table labels. 
Table 7 however, presents the average mean results for the standard and compound 
datasets respectively.  
Three algorithms from the SciKit machine learning library have been used for 
comparison purposes: Decision Tree, Random Forest and Neural Network multi-layer 
perceptron. The settings used for the algorithms were the following: 
Decision Tree: SciKit learn settings with default settings which included unlimited leaf 
nodes. 
Random Forest: SciKit Random Forest classifier with 50 Estimators. 
Neural Network: SciKit MLP classifier with lbfgs solver, alpha = 1e-5 and hidden 
layer size = (15,15,15). 
 
                                                        
1 The datasets can be found at https://github.com/npolatidis/seader 
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Table 1. Decision Tree results for the standard dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.736231884 0.826086957 0.583333333 
0.692885375 0.782608696 0.625 
0.68442029 0.833333333 0.458333333 
0.650362319 0.695652174 0.583333333 
0.656347826 0.76 0.608695652 
0.659914361 0.826086957 0.5 
0.694762846 0.826086957 0.416666667 
0.647463768 0.791666667 0.5 
0.65 0.695652174 0.583333333 
0.741798419 0.833333333 0.652173913 
0.681 0.787 0.551 
 
Table 2. Random Forest results for the standard dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.683333333 0.791666667 0.608695652 
0.631521739 0.708333333 0.565217391 
0.691304348 0.791666667 0.608695652 
0.657608696 0.75 0.565217391 
0.651811594 0.782608696 0.333333333 
0.700724638 0.75 0.666666667 
0.647826087 0.75 0.5 
0.736067194 0.782608696 0.708333333 
0.699130435 0.8 0.608695652 
0.72826087 0.826086957 0.583333333 
0.683 0.773 0.575 
 
Table 3. Multi-Layer Perceptron results for the standard dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.709057971 0.75 0.652173913 
0.74384058 0.826086957 0.652173913 
0.673043478 0.8 0.565217391 
0.640217391 0.782608696 0.47826087 
0.75273386 0.833333333 0.625 
0.65085639 0.739130435 0.541666667 
0.751449275 0.826086957 0.565217391 
0.659826087 0.739130435 0.56 
0.68173913 0.8 0.52173913 
0.65 0.695652174 0.583333333 
0.691 0.779 0.574 
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Table 4. Decision Tree results for the compound dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.908050847 0.916666667 0.9 
0.921481816 0.957983193 0.900826446 
0.921386555 0.941176471 0.890756303 
0.923023127 0.95 0.890756303 
0.921470588 0.957983193 0.9 
0.923120703 0.941176471 0.909090909 
0.909774011 0.93220339 0.891666667 
0.919747899 0.932773109 0.908333333 
0.913009121 0.925619835 0.899159664 
0.914705882 0.933333333 0.890756303 
0.918 0.939 0.898 
 
Table 5. Random Forest results for the compound dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.902910619 0.95 0.857142857 
0.919787138 0.941176471 0.900826446 
0.909703336 0.924369748 0.899159664 
0.92640056 0.941666667 0.915966387 
0.921414566 0.95 0.883333333 
0.919803922 0.941176471 0.891666667 
0.916468927 0.940677966 0.883333333 
0.911358543 0.933333333 0.883333333 
0.931468273 0.941666667 0.917355372 
0.911372549 0.916666667 0.907563025 
0.917 0.938 0.894 
 
Table 6. Multi-Layer Perceptron results for the compound dataset 
MEAN MAX MIN 
0.929803922 0.949579832 0.908333333 
0.921442577 0.932773109 0.908333333 
0.926414566 0.941666667 0.915966387 
0.923107345 0.933333333 0.908333333 
0.936442577 0.949579832 0.915966387 
0.919789916 0.949579832 0.891666667 
0.923120934 0.949579832 0.899159664 
0.924733894 0.941176471 0.899159664 
0.924747899 0.941666667 0.907563025 
0.921398477 0.949579832 0.907563025 
0.925 0.944 0.906 
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Table. 7. Comparison of algorithms for the standard and the compound datasets 
(a) (b)
ALGORITHM RESULT 
Decision Tree 0.681 
Random Forest 0.683 
Multi-Layer Perceptron 0.691 
ALGORITHM RESULT 
Decision Tree 0.918 
Random Forest 0.917 
Multi-Layer Perceptron 0.925 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we presented a novel method for social engineering attack detection based 
on natural language processing and artificial neural networks. The method initially pro-
cesses a dialogue and then creates a dataset that can be used for classification purposes. 
The proposed method has been evaluated using a real and a semi-synthetic dataset and 
can detect social engineering attacks with very high accuracy. Furthermore, alternative 
classification methods have been used for comparison in order to show the effectiveness 
of our method.  
Although the accuracy results are high, we believe that there is still room for 
improvement, thus in the future we plan investigate the possibility of adding more fea-
tures to the dataset and to apply a deep neural network for the classification process. In 
addition to that we aim to investigation performance and optimization issues. 
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